refugees in the Sudan. ' The Sudanese claim that they are responsible for sky-rocketing rents, periodic shortages of essential commodities, overcrowding of schools and health-care facilities, and other urban ills. The refugees claim that they are ignored by aid agencies and exploited by greedy landlords and rapacious employers. The majority appear to be only marginally integrated into their host economy and society; indeed, many are awaiting an external solution to their survival problems. Few see the Sudan as offering a desirable second home, so they do not make the psychological and economic investments necessary to build a new life there.
This short article reviews the findings from an investigation of 1,012 Ethiopian households in Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan; reveals that a mixture of forces brought these refugees out of their traditional 'homelands'; and concludes that their economic potential is under-reali~ed.~
Rejiugees Generated by Events Inside Ethiopia
The Sudan and Ethiopia share Africa's longest contiguous border; consequently it is not surprising that many Ethiopians find their way into eastern and central Sudan. The outbreak of guerilla warfare in the mid-I 960s between Eritrean secessionists and the central regime in Addis Ababa marked the beginning of an exodus which has seen as many as 650,000 Ethiopians enter the Sudan. After the 1974 ousting of Emperor Haile Selassie by a Leninist/Marxist junta, the new revolutionary leaders turned against actual and suspected foes: students, intellectuals, businessmen, and officials of the former government. Those who opposed the policies of the Dergue were imprisoned, often tortured, and frequently killed. During the 'Red Terror' from November 1977 to March 1978, thousands of suspected counterrevolutionaries were shot. Although the forces of the Dergue were not able to defeat the rebels in the countryside, they did fairly effectively drive their supporters out of many urban areas. Tens of thousands fled into the S~d a n .~ Apart from the victims of warfare and repression, the Sudan also shelters many economic migrants and drought casualities. Some crossed the frontier looking for seasonal labour and stayed for greater or lesser periods, often availing themselves of the hospitality offered by official refugee settlements. During the 1982-5 drought in western Ethiopia, approximately 500,000 migrants entered eastern Sudan. Although this influx badly strained the resources of the refugee assistance community and the Government, all were provided with emergency relief. Mostly farmers or herders, few of them entered Khartoum.
Survey of Urban Refugees
In order better to identify the socio-economic characteristics of the urban refugee community, a survey was made in March 1984 of over 1,000 refugee families living in Khartoum. A team of trained Ethiopian interviewers, using Table I summarises the major demographic characteristics of this survey. Particularly worthy of note is the fact that 67 per cent are Eritreans, almost all of urban origin, having travelled much further than, say, Ethiopian refugees from Gondar or even Tigray, who might have been expected to predominate because they lived closer to Khartoum. Fighting has been going on longer in Eritrea than elsewhere; consequently it is not surprising to find that most of the long-term residents originated in Amsara, Massawa, and other Eritrean cities. When the refugees were asked (i) why they left Ethiopia, and (ii) why they came to Khartoum, the major reasons given were to escape political persecution (mentioned by 60 per cent) and fighting ( I 2 per cent), and to seek employment (41 per cent) and to resettle in the United States (24 per cent), respectively.
Another view of the stimuli producing this mass movement of Ethiopian refugees is afforded by examining their previous socio-economic status as reflected by their former employment. Excluding the unemployed and housewives, we find that almost 60 per cent of the sample were probably former members of the Ethiopian middle or upper classes; overwhelmingly, they cite political persecution as the principal reason for fleeing Ethiopia, and they came to Khartoum in the hope of finding either local employment or resettlement in the United States1 In contrast, former farmers, herders, unskilled factory workers, and the unemployed claim that they became refugees in order to escape from fighting or to look for work, rather than because of persecution or military conscription. For these former members of the working and lower classes, seeking employment or family reunification were the main causes for them coming to Khartoum -see Table 2 .
That most refugees have not been able to find la dolce vita in Khartoum is suggested by the fact that the vast majority are employed in service and domestic occupations. These are hardly the positions which former senior secondary and college students, professionals, managers, technicians, or skilled workers find psychologically or financially rewarding. As Table 3 shows, unemployment and under-employment are significant problems faced by many Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum. While the Sudanese economy is suffering from an outflow to the nearby 'oil states' of approximately one million skilled workers and trchnicians, thr labour pool offered by these refugees remains undvr-utilised.
Special Problems oJ Female Refugees
The large percentage (45) of female respondents reflects the fact that this survey took place when many male heads of households were away at work. However, a closer look at the sample reveals that I o per cent are female-headed households containing dependent children, thereby illustrating the presence in Khartoum of a large number of war widows and women whose husbands have either abandoned or divorced them. While women without children also find living hard in Khartoum's Islamic society, those with dependent children are unable to take domestic or service jobs outside the home. Hence, many earn a bare subsistence by sewing, preparing food, or receiving occasional handouts from friends or family. Female-headed households face a particularly difficult time eking out a living; 36 per cent of such households earn less than LS75 per month as opposed to 14.5 per cent of those headed by males, while twice as many of the latter are in the highest income stratum (over LS3oo per month). Part of this discrepancy may result from lack of previous vocational training or educational preparation : three times as many women report themselves illiterate, and eight times as many men have received some post-secondary education. But even women with experience or credentials are barred from all but domestic or service jobs because (i) most do not speak Arabic, (ii) trade unions exclude refugees, and (iii) Islamic culture and Sudanese mores greatly restrict their employment opportunities.
Traditionally, many Ethiopian women found jobs as domestic servants in Sudanese homes. But in April 1984, the authorities began to enforce a law against 'attempted adultery', and to arrest couples who could not produce a marriage licence. Any married man found living with a woman not his wife was subject to death by crucifixion; typically, however, both parties 'merely' received 50-90 lashes with a horse whip, plus a fine and/or a prison sentence.l This and other aspects of Islamic 'Sharia' justice have potentially profound implications for Christian refugees who may now find their marginal status as refugees further compromised for being non-Muslims. Women, who are segregated and treated as legal inferiors to men under 'Sharia' and who also happen to be refugees, are among the hardest hit by the rising tide of religious intolerance because their occupational and physical mobility is further curtailed.
Economic Contribution of Urban Refugees
The Government of the Sudan and the U.N.H.C.R. subscribe to a policy of economic intergration and self-reliance for refugees. But little or nothing is being done to promote reaching this objective in urban areas. Nearly 2 0 per cent of Khartoum's refugees are unemployed, and far more are under-employed. The potential contribution to the local economy contained in the skilled hands and fertile minds of thousands of refugees is unrealised. For many refugees, Khartoum is a place of impoverishment and subsistence living. For example, over two-thirds of the sample reported that they received less daily income than is required to provide food, shelter, and basic necessities.
Refugees say that their poverty stems from exploitation by Sudanese landlords and employers -high rents, low pay -and there is merit in this claim. Since about half the refugees interviewed lack proper documents authorising them to live in Khartoum, they can hardly take a rapacious landlord or exploitative employer to court. Because Sudanese trade unions bar refugees from membership, their bargaining position with employers is very weak. Undocumented workers in Los Angeles, Paris, and Hong Kong are exploited, and it would be disingenuous to deny that this also happens in Khartoum.
Former Ethiopian businessmen and would-be capitalists are barred by Sudanese law from owning fixed assets, such as equipment or buildings. Credit is routinely refused; small sums command interest payment of as much as 10 per cent per week. Few Sudanese will form partnerships with Ethiopians, let alone with refugees, while local authorities refuse to issue them with business licences. Consequently, apart from petty trading and 'one-man stands', almost no refugees are to be found in the commercial sector.
Most refugees are relegated to low-paying service jobs or manual labour. Here they face stiff competition from tens of thousands of unskilled but Arabic-speaking and documented Sudanese. A few find domestic jobs in expatriate houses or with Sudanese families. But the absence of Arabic, funds, vocational training, and legitimate residential status are clear impediments to self-reliance and integration.
Aside from these structural factors, there may also be a lack of motivation or effort by some refugees to build a creative and productive life in the Sudan. Many apparently healthy, well-educated, young Ethiopians persist for years in a state of suspended animation. Some work part-time or for short periods at menial tasks, while others seem content to survive on handouts from friends or family. This economic lethargy may arise from the perception that labour is beneath the dignity of an 'aspiring bourgeois'. Many westernised Ethiopians simply may be unable psychologically to accept their presence in Sudanese society, which is very different from their indigenous experience. These young people may subconsciously refuse to become part of a society in which they are aliens. Christian refugees may resist putting down roots in an Islamic culture which openly rejects most of their beliefs and lifestyle.
For whatever reasons, the fact remains that many Ethiopians do not integrate into the local economy in any meaningful manner.
Impact of Rejiugees on Local Services
If the contribution by refugees to the economy of Sudan is slight, so too is their impact on local services. Although it is commonplace to hear complaints that they have driven up rents and placed a tremendous burden on local schools and health-care facilities, the results of the survey do not support these claims.
The total of I ,OI2 families interviewed contain only I 30 children in Sudanese schools. Two factors account for this: the sample -and probably the overall Ethiopian refugee community -is young, so many do not yet need any formal education; secondly, families with school-age children often enroll them in schools operated by one or another of the Ethiopian organisations in Khartoum. Apparently the emotions which bind the parents to Ethiopia are still powerful, and they want their offspring to be educated accordingly.
Because of cultural, economic, and even security reasons, few Ethiopians live alone -nearly 30 per cent of the sample stay with five or more room-mates Although the majority of refugee households are tied by blood, one-quarter are not; that is, they are composed of individuals from the same village, ethnic community, or simply fellow Ethiopians. (Cultural differences were cited overwhelmingly to explain the fact that very few Ethiopians, aside from domestic servants, share houses with Sudanese.) Family bonds are tight among Ethiopians. But economics must also play a strong part in determining living arrangements. Judged by local standards, where a labourer earns $1.50 per day and a middle-level civil servant or teacher $100 per month, a rent of more than $50 per month is burdensome. Yet, almost half the sample reports paying at least this much. Hence, dividing this burden among several wage earners, and probably providing shelter to one or two unemployed, is a common mechanism for coping with high rents.
Refugee tenants are a tiny fraction of the 200-300 thousand low-income families who have caused the Khartoum housing market to expand so dramatically during the past ten years. Ethiopians probably pay higher rents than the Sudanese; but they are not the cause of the general increase.
Out of a combined total of some 4,350 individuals in the households interviewed, only 97 stated that they had visited a government health centre or hospital during the previous seven days. Another 148 and 52 reported visits to private clinics and pharmacies, respectively. Without knowing the utilisation rate of a comparable Sudanese population, it is impossible to say if the figure for refugees is higher or lower than expected for the community in which they live. It is clear, none the less, that the refugees are not overwhelming the local health-care system by their sheer numbers.
Summary and Conclusions
Without question the 40,000 or so Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum add to the burden on the local economic system; although they do not place much demand on schools or hospitals, they do eat, ride in public transport, and rent houses. But it is incorrect to blame them for the decline in the standard of living and for the increases in prices and shortages of goods which Khartoum has '55 experienced over the past 5-10 years. Macro-economic factors such as inflation, declining productivity, and lower prices for exports, rather than refugees have reduced the once abundant and generous Khartoum econ0rny.l Ethiopians are a convenient scapegoat because the economic decline and their arrival are coincidental; in fact, the refugees are innocent. Indeed, should the Government remove obstacles to business and professional employment, the refugee community could play a much bigger part in national development and kconomic growth.
As a first step towards their economic integration, the Government of the Sudan should officially recognise the presence of the urban refugees, because at present those undocumented are subject to arrest and deportation to far-away settlements. Understandably most of them are unwilling to make an economic and psychological investment where they live. Having received residence permits, many might be encouraged to find durable solutions through commerce, business, vocational training, and so forth.
Once the Government recognises the right of the urban refugees to reside where they are, donor agencies can provide assistance to promote their economicintegration. For example, theU.N.H.C.R. could open an employment referral service, initiate vocational schools, and create health facilities in refugee-impacted neighbourhoods, and such a lead would be followed by private and voluntary organisations, as well as by official bilateral assistance.
An equally important policy step by the rCgime in Khartoum would be to insist that local authorities grant business licences and other economic documents to refugee applicants. Many highly skilled workers and technicians are presently under-employed because they cannot obtain labour permits. While employment is technically open to non-nationals on an equal footing with Sudanese, in practice local licence offices and the police discriminate and harass Ethiopians. The Sudanese leadership could be much more active in promoting a policy of economic integration.
The U.S. Government can also encourage local employment by reducing its resettlement programme to cater only for family reunification and other special priorities. Currently over go per cent of the Ethiopians who have been selected to go to America have no real claim to resettle there; they are merely more articulate or simply luckier in pressing their cause to Immigration and Naturalisation Service interviewers. But for every 10 who are selected, 500 remain -wanting to escape and reach Utopia. These young men and women often continue to dream for years, and while waiting they make no effort to become productive. This unintended consequence of American policy ought to be corrected by restricting eligibility to family reunification and to genuine security cases of refugees who cannot remain in their country of first asylum. By doing so, many dreamers might be encouraged to become productive members of the Sudanese economy.
The Sudanese economy showed a negative growth of -2.7 per cent during 1982-3; its trade There is the potential of a natural partnership between the host society, the international agencies, and the refugees which, if made operational, could lead to the achievement of economic self-reliance and integration. But all concerned must change their view of what constitutes their proper rBle if this goal is to be reached. Without such political and perceptual modifications, however, most Ethiopian refugees will continue to languish.
